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Asia’s Trade Performance 
after the Currency Crisis
he Asian currency crisis of 1997-98 was characterized by 
an abrupt reversal of foreign capital flows. Before the 
crisis, foreign capital inflows had allowed the crisis countries 
to attain a higher level of investment spending than could 
have been supported by domestic saving alone. Domestic 
and foreign investors suddenly lost confidence, liquidating 
their local asset holdings, and moving their capital to the 
safety of the United States and other countries. For the crisis 
countries, the shift from capital inflows to outflows had to be 
matched by their current account balances moving from 
deficit to surplus.
The improvement in the crisis countries’ current account 
balances was achieved through lower dollar imports, with 
dollar exports relatively unchanged. This picture, though, 
becomes richer when trade flows are viewed in terms of the 
volume of goods being shipped and the prices for these goods. 
With this breakdown, the flatness of exports is seen as a result 
of falling export prices masking increases in export volumes. 
Dollar imports dropped because both the volume of goods 
imported and the price of these goods fell sharply.
Simple trade models are used to flesh out the factors that 
drove the trade adjustment in South Korea and Thailand 
during the Asia crisis. The price models have dollar import and 
export prices tied to the country’s dollar exchange rate and 
world prices for tradable goods. Export volumes (dollar 
exports deflated by dollar export prices) are tied to foreign 
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• Countries experiencing an abrupt shift from 
large capital inflows to large outflows need to 
make a matching improvement in their current 
account balance.
• In 1997-98, the Asian crisis countries 
achieved such an improvement primarily 
through lower spending on imports, measured 
in dollars terms.
• However, a breakdown of trade flows into 
price and volume components reveals that 
higher export volumes, as well as lower import 
volumes, contributed to the current account 
adjustment.
• Dollar import and export prices fell together, 
with both tied to world prices.
• Export volumes rose as world demand outside 
of Asia grew, while import volumes declined 
sharply with the fall in domestic activity in 
the crisis countries.
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demand and relative prices (export prices divided by foreign 
prices), while import volumes are tied to domestic demand and 
relative prices (import prices relative to local prices).
A key observation is that import and export prices roughly 
tracked each other, with both tracking the behavior of world 
tradable goods prices. Indeed, trade prices were falling 
throughout Asia by similar magnitudes, regardless of how 
much each country’s currency depreciated. For both Thailand 
and Korea, import and export prices largely followed world 
export prices. For Thailand, the import and export price 
indexes did not seem to have been influenced much by the 
baht’s value, while those for Korea did appear to have been 
pushed down further by the won’s fall.
If import and export prices tended to move together during 
the currency crisis, then the bulk of the current account 
improvement had to be achieved through changes in trade 
volumes. Export volumes for both countries grew, helped by 
strong demand growth, on average, in the rest of the world. 
However, the jump in export volumes from both strong foreign 
demand and more competitive export prices was not enough to 
keep the value of exports from falling. With imports, the steep 
fall in domestic demand caused the volume of imported goods 
to collapse. Overall, the decline in local economic activity, due 
to the withdrawal of domestic and foreign capital, was the main 
factor behind the dramatic improvements in the current 
account balances of the crisis countries.
Linking Capital Flows and the
Current Account Balance
The reversal of capital inflows to Asian countries hit by the 
crisis and the improvement in the current account balances 
are two features of the same underlying phenomenon.1 
Specifically, capital flows in or out of a country are related to 
domestic saving and investment spending as follows:
(1) net foreign investment = domestic saving
- domestic investment.
Simply put, a country invests abroad when it has more savings 
than needed to finance domestic investment expenditure.2 
Such a country sends its surplus saving abroad to buy foreign 
assets. This stream of surplus saving is net foreign investment 
or net capital outflow, making the country a net lender to the 
rest of the world. Correspondingly, a country that invests more 
than it saves is a net borrower from the rest of the world. 
Adding up all the countries, the amount of world net 
borrowing must equal world net lending.
The current account balance also represents the extent of a 
country’s net borrowing or lending.3 A country is lending to 
the world when the value of the goods it sells abroad (exports) 
exceeds the value of the goods it receives in exchange (imports). 
Such a country accepts foreign IOUs, in the form of increased 
holdings of foreign assets, to finance the gap between exports 
and imports. Likewise, a country is borrowing from the rest 
of the world when it buys more than it sells. The change in a 
country’s debt is the same whether viewed as financing the gap 
between imports and exports or financing the gap between 
domestic investment and saving. So, the current account 
balance is related to domestic saving and investment spending:
(2) current account balance = domestic saving
- domestic investment.
The right-hand side of equation 2 is identical to the right-hand 
side of equation 1, meaning that a current account surplus is 
matched by an equal net outflow of investment funds overseas. 
By the same logic, a current account deficit is matched by an 
equal net inflow of foreign investment funds. This is a 
necessary insight for understanding the Asia crisis. Namely, 
when a crisis country goes from enjoying capital inflows to 
experiencing capital outflows, there must be a drop in 
investment spending relative to domestic saving and a swing 
from a current account deficit to a current account surplus.
Reversal in Foreign Capital Flows
Foreign capital flows into the four crisis-hit Asian countries 
(AC4)—Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand—were 
substantial during the precrisis years.4 Each experienced large 
current account deficits, meaning that funds borrowed from 
abroad (a capital inflow) financed a large portion of domestic 
investment spending. In 1996, the net capital inflow to these 
four countries climbed to $50 billion, allowing these economies 
to maintain a higher rate of investment spending than could be 
supported by domestic saving alone (Table 1). Indeed, in 1996, 
surplus foreign saving financed more than 11 percent of 
domestic investment spending in Indonesia and Malaysia,
12 percent in Korea, and 20 percent in Thailand.5
The reversal of this capital inflow was swift when currency 
and financial turbulence hit the region, beginning with 
Thailand in mid-1997.6 Net capital inflows declined to
$21 billion for 1997 as a whole, but were close to zero during 
the second half of the year. In 1998, the AC4 had net capital 
outflows of $68 billion.7 That is, over the course of two years 
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Instead of receiving funds, these crisis countries were now 
required to devote substantially less to investment spending to 
accommodate investors wanting to take capital out of the AC4 
countries.
Matching Reversal in Trade Flows
This article focuses on one part of the Asian currency crisis, 
namely, the mechanism through which the current account 
balance improved to match the reversal in capital flows. In 
particular, we study the question of what forced the 
merchandise balance—which makes up most of the current 
account balances—to move from deficit to surplus.
In the Asia crisis, almost all the adjustment in the merchandise 
trade balance was from steep declines in imports measured in 
dollar terms. The left column of Table 2 shows that dollar 
purchases from the United States, Japan, and the European 
Union fell as the AC4 severely cut back their demand for foreign 
goods. Dollar exports, listed in the middle column, remained 
essentially unchanged, although the flatness of the total masks 
significant differences in sales across countries. While exports to 
the United States and Europe increased, exports to Japan and the 
rest of Asia declined due to recessions in those countries.
The improvement in the trade balances of the AC4 was fairly 
equally distributed among the United States, Europe, and 
Japan, with the exception of Indonesia’s balance with Japan. 
Japan accounted for a roughly equal share of the current 
account improvement in the AC4 even though Japan was 
buying less from the crisis countries, while the United States 
and Europe were buying more. This was because export sales 
from Japan to the AC4 fell more than did export sales from the 




Country 1996 1997 1998
Change in 
1996-98
Korea -23.0 -8.2 40.6 63.6
Thailand -14.7 -3.0 14.2 28.9
Indonesia -7.7 -4.9 4.0 11.6
Malaysia -4.6 -4.8 9.5 14.1
  Total  -49.9 -20.8 68.3 118.2
Memo:
United States -129.3 -143.8 -220.6 -91.3
Source: International Monetary Fund.
Note: Data are based on the current account balances, which include the 
trade balance for goods and services, the balance for factor services, 
and unilateral transfers.
Table 2
Merchandise Trade: Changes from 1996
to 1998
Billions of Dollars
Country Imports Exports Net
Korea
United States -12.9 0.8 13.7
Japan -14.6 -4.3 10.2
European Union -10.6 1.3 11.9
Developing Asia -3.2 -4.1 -0.9
Other and nonspecified -15.8 9.0 24.8
  Total -57.1 2.6 59.7
Thailand
United States -3.3 2.6 5.8
Japan -9.3 -1.7 7.5
European Union -4.2 1.2 5.4
Developing Asia -3.8 -1.5 2.2
Other and nonspecified -3.8 0.3 4.0
  Total -24.3 0.8 25.1
Malaysia
United States -1.3 2.0 3.3
Japan -8.3 -2.7 5.6
European Union -4.6 1.2 5.8
Developing Asia -1.9 -5.2 -3.4
Other and nonspecified -0.4 1.8 2.2
  Total -16.6 -3.0 13.6
Indonesia
United States -2.5 1.8 4.3
Japan -3.4 -3.0 0.5
European Union -4.4 1.0 5.3
Developing Asia 0.7 3.3 2.6
Other and nonspecified -2.3 2.1 4.5
  Total -11.9 5.2 17.2
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Decomposing Trade Flows into Price 
and Volume Components
The AC4 countries saw their trade balances improve dra-
matically, with imports falling sharply while exports were 
largely flat. To better understand this behavior, it is useful to 
decompose imports and exports into their price and volume 
components. For example,
(3) dollar value of exports = export price (in dollar terms)
×  export volume.
That is, the dollar value of exports equals the dollar price times 
the volume of goods sold.9 Any change in exports can be 
viewed, then, as some combination of changes in the price of 
export goods and the volume of export sales.
Table 3 uses this framework to break down dollar trade 
flows for the AC4 countries into their price and volume 
components. On the export side, crisis country sales stagnated 
in dollar terms because moderate-to-robust growth in export 
volumes was countered by declines in export prices. The offset 
was almost one-to-one for Korea. From 1996 to 1998, higher 
export volumes raised sales by $36 billion, but lower export 
prices reduced the value of these sales by $33 billion. The offset 
was more than one-to-one for Thailand, Indonesia, and 
Malaysia. The increase in export volumes was not enough to 
counter the price decline causing the dollar value of export 
sales to fall. These offsetting price and volume movements 
explain why little or none of the adjustments in AC4 dollar 
trade balances occurred on the export side despite the currency 
depreciations, which improved the price competitiveness of 
AC4 goods in the world markets.
Both import prices and volumes for the AC4 countries fell, 
with the exception of a reported increase in import volumes for 
Indonesia.10 For Korea, the decline in import volumes lowered 
imports by $28 billion, while lower import prices pushed down 
the dollar value of imports by an additional $29 billion. The 
pattern was much the same for the other crisis countries. These 
reinforcing price and volume movements resulted in essen-
tially all of the adjustments in AC4 dollar trade balances 
occurring on the import side.
Table 4 places AC4 export and import price movements in 
a broader setting, comparing them with price movements 
elsewhere in the Pacific Rim region and with an index for the 
world as a whole. Dollar export price indexes were down 
substantially in the AC4 countries from 1996 to 1998, ranging 
from a 14.7 percent decline for Thailand to a 30.4 percent 
decline for Indonesia. Notably, however, the declines in dollar 
export prices fell far short of the corresponding declines in 
currency values. In addition, dollar export prices also declined 
substantially elsewhere in the Pacific Rim, despite far more 
modest currency depreciations. Indeed, large currency declines 
for Thailand and Malaysia did not cause their prices to move 
out of line with prices in other noncrisis Asian countries. 
(Export prices for the Philippines are an exception.) A similar 
Reinforcing price and volume movements 
resulted in essentially all of the adjustments 
in [the four crisis countries’] dollar trade 
balances occurring on the import side. 
Table 3
Merchandise Trade: Decomposition of Changes
in Balance
Billions of Dollars
Country Exports Imports Balance
Korea
1996 129.7 150.3 -20.6
1998 132.3 93.3 39.0
Change 2.6 -57.0 59.6
Price effect -33.4 -29.4 -4.0
Volume effect 36.0 -27.7 63.7
Thailand
1996 55.8 72.4 -16.6
1998 54.8 43.1 -22.3
Change -1.0 -29.3 28.3
Price effect -8.8 -7.4 -1.4
Volume effect 7.8 -21.9 29.7
Indonesia
1996 49.8 42.9 6.9
1998 48.8 27.3 -22.3
Change -1.0 -15.6 14.6
Price effect -18.3 -17.9 -0.4
Volume effect 17.3 2.3 15.0
Malaysia
1996 92.3 90.9 1.4
1998 82.7 66.9 -22.3
Change -9.6 -24.0 14.4
Price effect -14.0 -11.5 -2.5
Volume effect 4.4 -12.4 16.8
Source: International Monetary Fund.
Notes: The trade flow and price data refer to merchandise imports and 
exports for Korea and Thailand, and to national income and product 
accounts (NIPA) for imports and exports for Indonesia and Malaysia. 
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pattern holds for dollar import prices, with large declines in  
both the AC4 countries and elsewhere in the Pacific Rim.
Trade prices fell worldwide during this period. Oxford 
Economic Forecasting calculates an index of export prices for 
merchandise goods from twenty-three of the largest exporting 
countries.11 This world index fell 10.8 percent between 1996 
and 1998. One factor was the drop in world prices for oil and 
non-oil commodities during this period, in part because of the 
slowdown in Japan and the rest of Asia. This global price 
decline raises the question, were the export and import price 
declines for the AC4 driven by the countries’ steep currency 
depreciations, or were they largely following global trends?12 
To answer this question, in the following section we examine 
the relative importance of world prices and exchange rate 
developments in explaining the behavior of trade prices.
Exchange Rates and Prices
In the early months of the Asian currency crisis, many 
observers predicted that the United States and other industrial 
countries would soon be flooded with a wave of cheap goods 
from the AC4. The argument was that reduced currency values 
would allow AC4 producers to lower their dollar export prices 
while maintaining healthy profit margins, since their 
production costs are largely denominated in local currency 
terms. As seen above, dollar prices for AC4 exports did fall 
significantly, but in some cases not by much more than those 
of other Asian countries that had more modest currency 
declines.
One factor to consider in interpreting pricing behavior is 
that developing countries often export commodity-like 
products, such as raw materials, steel, or textiles, for which 
close substitutes are available. As a result, local producers of 
these goods have little or no influence over the dollar prices of 
their exports, which are instead set by world supply and 
demand conditions. Output is sold at the prevailing world 
dollar price and the exchange rate for any particular country 
has no consequences on the price competitiveness of its 
commodity-like exports.
A currency collapse can, nevertheless, boost export volumes 
of commodity-like goods by lowering a country’s production 
costs. Firms tend to set export sales at a level where their 
marginal cost of production equals the world price. A currency 
depreciation may not change the dollar price of exports, 
but it does lower the dollar costs of labor and other inputs. 
Consequently, domestic exporters have a profit incentive to 
produce more exports, up to the point where the higher 
marginal cost from increased production equals the dollar 
export price.
The magnitude of any such increase in export production is 
limited by how much costs fall with a currency decline. The 
dollar cost of domestic labor and other local inputs shrinks, but 
the dollar price of imported inputs must be considered along 
with any sensitivity in domestic input prices, as well as the cost 
of capital to exchange rate movements. If dollar production 
costs fall less than these considerations, then there is less profit 
incentive for firms to increase their export sales. Dependency 
Table 4
Trade Prices after the Crisis
Percentage Change: 1996–98
Country Export Prices Import Prices Exchange Rate
Crisis countries
Indonesia -30.4 -39.9 320.7
Korea -22.3 -21.8 79.8
Malaysia -14.8 -13.7 56.3
Thailand -14.7 -12.2 62.3
Other Pacific Rim 
  countries
Australia -18.7 -14.9 24.5
Hong Kong -5.3 -7.2 0.1
Japan -14.2 -15.0 20.3
Philippines 11.3 -3.4 56.0
Singapore -18.6 -18.5 18.7
Taiwan -11.6 -18.5 21.9






Source: Oxford Economic Forecasting.
Notes: All data refer to percentage changes in dollar prices from 1996 to 
1998. The trade price data refer to merchandise imports and exports, where 
possible. Due to data limitations, the price data for Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
the Philippines are from national income and product accounts, so imports 
and exports include merchandise trade and trade in nonfactor services. The 
world price of manufactured exports is calculated by Oxford Economic 
Forecasting as a trade-weighted average of the dollar export price of nonfuel 
exports for twenty-three countries, with the weights based on shares of 
world exports. The oil price series refers to the dollar spot price of a barrel of 
Brent crude. The series for world non-oil commodity prices is a dollar-
based aggregate constructed by the International Monetary Fund in its 
International Financial Statistics.42 Asia’s Trade Performance after the Currency Crisis
on imported inputs therefore restrains export volumes from 
rising following a currency decline.
This observation holds for exports from factories that 
assemble imported components and then ship these items back 
out of the country. Such products will have stable dollar 
production costs and consequently stable export prices 
following a currency crisis because local labor and material 
costs are a small share of the item’s value.13
The discussion of pricing behavior can be broadened to 
include items for which close, but not perfect, substitutes are 
available elsewhere. A firm producing a noncommodity-like 
good has some control over its prices because it has less direct 
competition. The profit-maximizing strategy for such a firm is 
to set the level of prices according to how responsive foreign 
demand is to changes in dollar prices. For exporting firms, 
dropping the dollar price of their exports in proportion to the 
local currency’s decline in value would move them away from 
the profit-maximizing dollar price based on the demand 
characteristics of their foreign customers. As a consequence, 
firms in a crisis country moderate any decline in dollar export 
prices. They therefore gain both a higher export volume from 
the modest price discount and a higher profit margin on each 
item exported.14
In sum, the extent of any fall in dollar export prices 
following a currency crisis is limited by various factors. For 
commodity-like goods, dollar export prices are dictated by 
world supply and demand conditions. These prices are largely 
unaffected by a specific country’s devaluation, although for a 
broad-based phenomenon like the Asia crisis, there can be 
feedback to world prices through lower global activity. Prices 
for noncommodity-like goods are not as closely tied to world 
prices and can change in response to any currency swing. The 
extent of any price adjustment to exchange rates, though, is 
limited since exporters of these goods want to keep dollar 
prices stable near the level dictated by foreign market 
conditions.
The Korean and Thai Experiences
Import and Export Prices
Data were collected for Korea and Thailand for a more detailed 
examination of import and export pricing behavior (see Box 1 
for an empirical analysis). The two countries provide some 
contrasts in the level of development and export orientation. 
Korea is a relatively large, middle-income country, and a major 
exporter of metal products, automobiles, and electronic equip-
ment. Thailand is a smaller, newly industrializing country, and 
remains primarily a commodity exporter, although it also 
functions as an assembly platform for electronic components 
produced elsewhere.
As discussed above, the export-pricing behavior of firms in 
developing countries is influenced by world export prices and 
the local exchange rate. A country that exports mostly 
commodity-like goods would have dollar export prices move 
proportionally to world dollar export prices, leaving prices 
relatively unaffected by the exchange rate. A more developed 
country, with a greater share of noncommodity-like exports, 
would have its export prices more affected by any change in 
currency values.
Chart 1 depicts graphically Korean and Thai export prices 
and the index of world export prices found in Table 4. The 
dollar exchange rates are also included, although note that the 
exchange rates are inverted to dollar/won and dollar/baht rates 
so that prices and exchange rates move in the same directions. 
For the first half of the 1990s, exchange rates were fairly stable, 
particularly in Thailand, and each country’s export prices were 
largely unchanged, as was the world export price index. With 
the crisis, Korean export prices fell with the won at the end of 
1997, dropping below the world export price index, suggesting 
that Korean exporters took advantage of the currency decline 
to boost their price competitiveness on world markets. The 
story is somewhat similar for Thailand, with its export prices 
falling relative to the world price index. The decline, though, is 
not as large as it was for Korean export prices, even though the 
baht and the won weakened to about the same extent. This is 
consistent with the observation that Thai exports tend to be 
more commodity-like or more dependent on imported 
components than Korean goods and thus less prone to deviate 
from world export prices.
Import prices in each country largely followed export prices 
(Table 4). Korean import prices fell below world export prices 
The export-pricing behavior of firms
in developing countries is influenced
by world export prices and the local 
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when the won depreciated, while Thai prices fell less sharply, 
implying that foreign firms were more likely to discount prices 
in Korea than in Thailand. One explanation for the difference 
in price behavior is that there is a greater range of locally 
produced alternatives in Korea, which put more pressure on 
foreign suppliers to cut prices in order to maintain sales. In 
addition, the assembly operations in Thailand rely on 
components from parent operations for which the issue of 
price discounting is not relevant.
Trade Volumes
Trade volumes depend on both the overall demand and the 
price of the goods being traded relative to domestically 
produced alternatives. Demand reflects all purchases, for both 
domestic and imported goods. For example, if local demand 
falls, then import volumes tend to fall along with the rest of the 
economy. Relative prices influence, for any given level of 
demand, consumer choice between foreign and domestic 
Export Prices
To model export price behavior, consider an equation of the form:
(1) ,
where   is the country’s export price index at time t, measured 
in dollar terms, and    is an index of world export prices, also 
measured in dollar terms. (These series were used in Table 4.) The 
exchange rate is   , in units of local currency per dollar, and   is 
a random error term. (All variables are in natural logarithms.)
The cointegration method is used to measure the long-run 
relationship for the three variables.a For Korea, both world prices 
and exchange rates are important in determining the long-run 
behavior of Korean export prices (see table).b The estimates 
indicate that Korean dollar export prices respond essentially 
one-to-one to a change in world dollar prices. The won is also an 
important factor, with the estimate indicating that a 1.0 percent won 
depreciation is correlated with a 0.25 percent decline in dollar export 
prices. The error-correction coefficient indicates that any gap 
between actual and “long-run” values for dollar export prices erodes 
at a rate of about 15 percent per quarter. Ignoring any effects of the 
exchange rate on world export prices, this implies that roughly 
50 percent of any divergence disappears, on average, over four 
quarters, and 75 percent disappears over eight quarters. The results 
for Thailand show that Thai export prices are also tied to world 
prices, but appear to be unaffected by the exchange rate as the coeffi-
cient on the exchange rate is statistically insignificant from zero.





Empirical Analysis of Long-Run Pricing Behavior
Import and Export Price Regressions
Korea Thailand
Dollar Export Prices Dollar Import Prices Dollar Export Prices Dollar Import Prices
World export prices 1.04 0.94 1.14 1.54
(.06) (.07) (.08) (.07)
Exchange rate -0.25 -0.24 .01 -.09
(.06) (.06) (.24) (.07)
Adjusted R2  0.93 0.85 0.91 0.95
Error-correction coefficient -0.15 -0.43 -0.14 -0.23
(.06) (.19) (.05) (.05)
Trace statistic 33.9 35.6 36.1 42.3
 5 percent critical value 34.9 34.9 34.9 34.9
Observations 68 68 68 68
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from Oxford Economic Forecasting.
Notes: The sample period is 1982:1 to 1998:4. All variables are in natural logarithms. World export prices are a trade-weighted average of the dollar price 
of  nonfuel exports for twenty-three countries, with the weights derived from relative shares of total world exports. For Korea, this index was adjusted to 
exclude Korean data. Thailand is not in the index. For imports, world export prices are a weighted average of the dollar price of nonfuel exports for fif-
teen trading partners, with the weights derived from relative shares of Korean or Thai imports in 1995. The Johansen (1991) trace statistic tests for the 
presence of a cointegrating relationship among the variables studied. The Newey-West adjusted standard errors are in parentheses.44 Asia’s Trade Performance after the Currency Crisis
goods. Because import prices tend to rise relative to local prices 
following a currency depreciation, demand tends to shift from 
imported to domestic goods, putting additional downward 
pressure on imports during a crisis. Similar intuition applies to 
export volumes, with the two determinants being foreign 
demand and the price of exports relative to prices in foreign 
markets. (See Box 2 for an empirical analysis.)
Supply-side factors, unfortunately, can complicate the story  
of how relative prices affect trade volumes. For example, a 
depreciation that raises relative import prices also lowers the 
costs of labor and local inputs in foreign currency terms, 
increasing the incentives for domestic exporters to boost their 
foreign sales. As a result, these firms may choose to purchase 
more imported materials and components despite higher 
import prices, particularly if there are few domestically 
produced alternatives.
Korea and Thailand had somewhat different experiences 
when it came to export volume growth during the crisis. Both 
were helped by strong foreign growth outside of Asia and lower 
relative export prices. Korean firms, though, did particularly 
well, with exports up roughly 20 percent over the course of 
1998. As discussed above, the won’s decline boosted Korean 
aSee Stock and Watson (1993) for a discussion of dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS). DOLS modifies basic ordinary least squares estimation 
by including both leads and lags of the first difference of all explanatory variables. These additional regressors are necessary because estimates in a 
single-equation model can be biased by endogeneity among the variables. Two leads and three lags were used, with the longest leads and lags 
eliminated if they were statistically insignificant. At least one lead and one lag were included. The coefficients on these variables are not included 
in the table because they have no economic significance. The residuals used for the error-correction coefficient are calculated from the long-run 
coefficients estimated by DOLS, but without the first-difference variables. Following Caporale and Chui (1999), the Johansen (1991) trace statistic  
tests for cointegration (using four lags and a constant), while DOLS is used for estimation because it performs better for small samples (see Stock 
and Watson [1993]). The Johansen results are similar, with the exception of the relative price terms in the volume regressions. The Johansen 
estimates are zero for the two Korean equations and implausibly high for Thailand.
bThe trace statistic just misses the 5 percent critical value for Korean export prices. It is well above the 10 percent critical value.
cHung, Kim, and Ohno (1993), using a different specification estimated from 1970 to 1989, found a coefficient of around 0.4 for the exchange rate.
Import Prices
The estimated equation treats dollar import prices as a function of 
world dollar prices and the exchange rate:
(2) ,
where    is the country’s import price, measured in dollar 
terms,    represents world dollar export prices, also 
measured in dollar terms, and   is a random error term.
The measure of world prices for the import price equations 
differs somewhat from the one used for export prices to make it 
more specific to each country’s trade flows. The import-weighted 
world export price measure is an average of export prices for 
fifteen Korean and Thai trading partners, with the weights based 
on 1995 import shares.
The coefficient estimates suggest that both world prices and 
exchange rate variables are important in understanding the pricing 
behavior of foreign producers selling in Korea. A 1.0 percent 
increase in world export prices is estimated to raise dollar import 
prices by roughly 1.0 percent over the long run, while a 1.0 percent 
currency depreciation is estimated to lower dollar import prices by 
0.25 percent.c Foreign firms apparently respond to a weaker won 
by cutting dollar prices and lowering their profit margins in order 
to moderate any drop in sales volumes.
The exchange rate’s impact on Thai import prices is not 
evident, as the coefficient on the baht exchange rate is not 
statistically distinct from zero. The estimates indicate that a 
1.0 percent increase in the world dollar price raises Thai import 
prices by 1.6 percent. This is higher than expected, since it would 
seem that Thai prices should move fairly proportionately to world 
prices. One possible explanation is that there are significant 
differences in the composition of the two indexes with the goods in 
the Thai import price index being more volatile than the goods 
included in the world price index.
The conclusion from these regressions is that import and 
export prices in both countries are tied to world prices over the 
long run. Korean import and export prices also react to the won 
exchange rate, while Thai prices do not respond to the baht over 
the long run. In addition, these estimates suggest that import and 
export prices tend to move together over time in both countries, so 
that adjustments to the trade balance in the long run come largely 
through changes in import and export volumes.














































Source: Oxford Economic Forecasting.
Note: The chart is based on the data in the Box 1 table.
competitiveness by allowing firms to lower their export prices 
relative to world export prices. In addition, Korean firms were 
able to shift production from the domestic market to stronger 
foreign markets. By comparison, Thailand’s exports were only 
up slightly. One factor is that its export prices did not fall as 
much as Korea’s, for reasons discussed above. In addition, 
because of differences in the stages of economic development, 
Thai exporters were less likely than their Korean counterparts 
to also serve the local market. As a consequence, the collapse in 
local demand freed up less capacity in Thailand that could be 
used for exports.
As for import volumes, lower domestic demand and higher 
import prices relative to domestically produced goods both 
worked to drag down the demand for imported goods during 
the crisis. Over the second half of 1997, the change in relative 
import prices was dramatic, with import prices up 30 percent 
in Korea relative to domestic prices and up 40 percent in 
Thailand. Higher domestic inflation, though, quickly mod-
erated the change in relative prices, and thus any consequences 
for import demand, as the gap between import and domestic 
prices diminished in both countries to roughly 10 percent by 
mid-1998 relative to mid-1997 levels.
A more clear-cut influence on import volumes was the drop 
in domestic consumption and investment during the currency 
crisis that quickly choked off the demand for imported goods 
in both Korea and Thailand. Chart 2 shows how imports rose 
steadily during the first half of the 1990s, growing faster than 
the domestic economy in both countries. With the beginning 
of the crisis in mid-1997, import volumes dropped in line with 
the steep decline in domestic demand experienced by both 
countries. It was the collapse in consumption and investment 
spending—as capital was pulled out and domestic interest rates 
jumped—that was a key factor in the large swing in each 
country’s current account balance during the crisis.46 Asia’s Trade Performance after the Currency Crisis
The impact of changes in foreign demand and relative prices on 
export volumes can be evaluated using a model of the form:
(1) .
In the expression above,   represents export volumes,   
represents foreign domestic demand, and   represents the price 
of exports relative to foreign producer prices.a Growth in foreign 
domestic demand should raise export volumes, implying  ; 
higher export prices (relative to foreign prices) should reduce sales 
abroad, so that  . Note that the regression is a reduced form, 
so the estimate of  also includes any supply response to changes 
in relative prices. A similar expression can be used for imports, 
except that the demand variable is now own-country domestic 
demand, and the price variable is the common-currency price of 
imports relative to domestic prices.
The coefficients for export volume highlight the importance of 
foreign demand (see table). For Korea, a 1.0 percent increase in 
foreign domestic demand is estimated to bring a 2.5 percent 
increase in export volume. The foreign demand elasticity for 
Thailand is even higher, at 3.3 percent. For Korea, a 1.0 percent 
decline in relative export prices is estimated to raise export 
volumes by 0.5 percent over the long run, while for Thailand, the 
corresponding figure is 0.6 percent.b Both coefficients for relative 
prices, however, have relatively large standard errors, raising 
questions about their statistical significance. The low coefficient 
estimates might be regarded as surprising since a profit-
maximizing firm would not choose a point on its demand curve at 
which the elasticity of demand is below unity. The price coefficient, 
though, represents the reduced form estimate of how a change in 
relative prices affects trade volumes, and as such includes both 
supply- and demand-side factors.
Turning to imports, the estimates indicate that a 1.0 percent 
increase in Korean domestic demand raises import volumes by 
about 1.5 percent, with the corresponding figure for Thailand 
slightly higher, at 1.6 percent.c, d On the price side, a 1.0 percent 
increase in relative import prices is estimated to lower import 
volumes over the long run by 0.3 percent for Korea and 0.5 percent 
for Thailand. Again, large standard errors for the relative price 
coefficient raise questions about their statistical significance. As 
with exports, the low coefficients imply that a drop in import 
prices relative to domestic prices tends to lower the dollar value of 
imported goods over the long run since import volumes do not rise 
enough to compensate for the lower price.
xvt α 0 α 1 + fddt α 2 + × rpxt ε 1 + × =
exv fdd
rpx
α 1 0 >
α 2 0 <
α 2
Box 2
Empirical Analysis of Long-Run Trade Volume Behavior
aThe  relative price term is the export price index relative to a weighted average of foreign producer prices, with all price indexes converted into 
dollar terms. It is meant to track changes in the price competitiveness of goods exported to those produced in the foreign market as seen by foreign 
customers.
bIt is debatable whether the ratio of price levels can continue to diverge over the long run. Statistically, relative price variables are nonstationary in 
this sample period, which is necessary to use the cointegration methodology. Other papers that use cointegration for estimating trade models also 
find that relative import and export prices are nonstationary. See Caporale and Chui (1999) and Hooper et al. (1998).
c The trace statistic just misses the 5 percent critical value for Korean import volumes. It is within the 10 percent critical value.
dIt is an empirical regularity that import demand elasticities for developing countries are smaller than export elasticities. The opposite tends to be 
true for developed countries. Since developing countries tend to grow faster, this difference in demand elasticities works to stabilize the trade 











Demand 1.48 2.50 1.61 3.25
(domestic demand for 
imports, foreign 
demand for exports)
(.03) (.06) (.06) (.19)




(.25) (.10) (.38) (.88)
Adjusted R2 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.98
Error-correction -0.45 -0.27 -0.21 -0.18
  coefficient (.14) (.08) (.08) (.06)
Trace statistic 32.2 46.2 35.0 40.7
5 percent critical value 34.9 34.9 34.9 34.9
Observations 68 68 68 68
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from Oxford Economic 
Forecasting.
Notes: The sample period is 1982:1 to 1998:4. All variables are in loga-
rithms. Volumes refer to dollar levels divided by dollar trade prices. 
Volume data, as well as home-country demand data, were seasonally 
adjusted using X-11. For Korean imports, the national income and 
product accounts for domestic demand is the demand measure. Due to 
data constraints, industrial production is the demand variable for Thai 
imports. For exports, the demand variable is a trade-weighted average 
of domestic demand for sixteen major countries with weights based on 
1995 export shares. The relative price in the export equation refers to 
export prices in dollars divided by the foreign producer price index, 
also in dollars. The latter variable is calculated using the same export 
weights for sixteen countries. The Johansen (1991) trace statistic tests 
for the presence of a cointegrating relationship among the variables 
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Source: Oxford Economic Forecasting.













The shift from capital inflows to capital outflows during a 
currency crisis requires a country’s current account balance to 
go from deficit to surplus. In terms of dollar import and export 
values, the countries of Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and 
Thailand achieved almost all of this improvement in current 
account balances through lower imports. By breaking down 
trade flows into their price and volume components, however, 
we see that the current account adjustment came from both 
lower import volumes and higher export volumes. Dollar 
import and export prices fell together in crisis countries, 
minimizing the direct impact on the current account balance 
from any exchange-rate-driven changes in prices. The burden 
was therefore left to trade volumes. Export volumes rose, fueled 
by lower export prices relative to foreign prices and growth in 
foreign domestic demand outside of Asia. On the import side, 
volumes declined sharply, hit by higher import prices relative 
to local prices and, more importantly, by dramatic contractions 
in domestic demand.
Of all the changes in trade flows during a currency crisis, a 
drop in import volumes is the one change most likely to be 
responsible for the majority of the current account 
improvement. Any success in boosting export volumes helps, 
since exports support domestic production and employment, 
while lower imports reflect the local economy’s weakness. In 
Asia, the four crisis countries benefited from their exporters’ 
ability to overcome the soft local demand during the crisis and 
increase their export volume sales to the world when their 
economies were being hit by investment capital outflows.Endnotes
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1.  See Higgins and Klitgaard (1998) for a more detailed exposition of 
the national income accounting relationships discussed here.
2.  Domestic saving is the sum of private saving and government 
saving. Private saving includes both individuals’ saving and business- 
retained earnings. Government saving refers to tax receipts less 
expenditure on current goods and services. Domestic investment is 
private and government investment.
3.  The current account balance includes the trade balance for goods 
and services, the balance for factor services, and unilateral transfers.
4.  The current account balance, derived primarily from trade 
statistics, is used to measure capital flows. The matching capital 
account balance is believed to be a much less accurate measure.
5.  All four countries devoted a large share of output to investment 
spending. In 1996, investment as a share of GDP was 31 percent in 
Indonesia and Thailand, 37 percent in Korea, and 42 percent in 
Malaysia.
6.  See Pesenti and Tille (2000) for theories of why these countries 
suffered a loss of investor confidence.
7.  The capital outflows from the four Asian crisis countries must be 
matched by an increase in net financial inflows for other economies. 
The United States was a major recipient of these inflows, which helped 
boost domestic investment spending. See van Wincoop and Yi (2000).
8. The deterioration in Japan’s trade balances with the AC4 countries 
did not keep Japan’s overall current account surplus from rising 
substantially during this period. Its balance improved because the 
local recession freed up more savings to export to the rest of the world. 
So, while a close trading partner to a crisis country will suffer from 
lower exports to that market, it is not at all necessary that the total 
current account balance of the noncrisis country deteriorates.
9.  Prices are measured using available import and export price 
indexes denominated in local currency terms for the AC4 countries. 
These indexes are then converted into dollar price indexes using 
prevailing dollar exchange rates. For example, the Thai dollar export 
price is the dollar price per unit of Thai exports.
10.  The reported rise in Indonesian import volumes during a severe 
recession raises doubts about the reliability of this data series.
11.  The measure of world dollar prices is calculated by Oxford 
Economic Forecasting as a trade-weighted average of nonfuel 
merchandise export price indexes for twenty-three industrial and 
newly industrializing economies, converted into dollar terms. The 
weights correspond to shares of total world merchandise exports. 
There are weaknesses with this measure, since export price indexes 
across countries differ in the types of goods included and in the 
statistical methodologies used. Unfortunately, a world price measure 
that is identical in nature to the export price index of the crisis country 
is not available.
12.  The broad-based nature of the Asian currency crisis makes it likely 
that world export prices were pushed down by the steep drop in 
output throughout the region.
13.  The increase in export volumes is also limited by available 
capacity. These factories tend to produce exclusively for the export 
market. Capacity is therefore not freed up by the fall in domestic 
demand.
14.  See Goldberg and Knetter (1997) for a review of models of export-
pricing behavior. See Marston (1990), Knetter (1993), and Klitgaard 
(1999) for empirical studies of U.S. and/or Japanese export pricing 
behavior. See Hung, Kim, and Ohno (1993) for a study that includes 
estimates for Korea and Taiwan. They find that exchange rates are 
important in export-pricing behavior for Korea, but not for Taiwan.References
FRBNY Economic Policy Review / September 2000 49
Caporale, Guglielmo, and Michael Chui. 1999. “Estimating Income and 
Price Elasticities of Trade in a Cointegration Framework.” Review 
of International Economics 7, no. 2: 254-64.
Goldberg, Penelopi, and Michael Knetter. 1997. “Goods Prices and 
Exchange Rates: What Have We Learned?” Journal of Economic 
Literature 35, no 3: 1243-72.
Higgins, Matthew, and Thomas Klitgaard. 1998. “Viewing the Current 
Account Deficit as a Capital Inflow.” Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York Current Issues in Economics and Finance 4, no. 13.
Hooper, Peter, Karen Johnson, and Jaime Marquez. 1998. “Trade 
Elasticities for the G-7 Countries.” Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System International Finance Discussion Paper 
no. 609.
Hung, Wansing, Yoonbai Kim, and Kenichi Ohno. 1993. “Pricing 
Exports: A Cross-Country Study.” Journal of International 
Money and Finance 12, no. 1: 3-28.
Johansen, Soren. 1991. “Estimation and Hypothesis of Cointegration 
Vectors in Guassian Vector Autoregressive Models.” 
Econometrica 59, no. 6: 1551-80.
Klitgaard, Thomas. 1999. “Exchange Rates and Profit Margins: The 
Case of Japanese Exporters.” Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
Economic Policy Review 5, no. 1: 41-54.
Knetter, Michael. 1993. “International Comparisons of Price-to-
Market Behavior.” American Economic Review 83, no. 3:
198-210.
Krugman, Paul. 1989. “Differences in Income Elasticities and Trends 
in Real Exchange Rates.” European Economic Review 33, no. 5: 
1031-54.
Marston, R. C. 1990. “Pricing to Market in Japanese Manufacturing.” 
Journal of International Economics 29, nos. 3-4: 217-36.
Pesenti, Paolo, and Cédric Tille. 2000. “The Economics of Currency 
Crises and Contagion: An Introduction.” Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York Economic Policy Review 6, no. 3: 3-16.
Stock, James, and Mark Watson. 1993. “A Simple Estimator of 
Cointegrating Vectors in Higher Order Integrated Systems.” 
Econometrica 61, no. 4: 783-820.
van Wincoop, Eric, and Kei-Mu Yi. 2000. “Asia Crisis Postmortem: 
Where Did the Money Go and Did the United States Benefit?” 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review 6, 
no. 3: 51-70.
The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York or the Federal Reserve System. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York provides no warranty, express or 
implied, as to the accuracy, timeliness, completeness, merchantability, or fitness for any particular purpose of any 
information contained in documents produced and provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in any form or 
manner whatsoever.